<?xml version="1.0" encoding="UTF-8"?><rss version="2.0"
	xmlns:content="http://purl.org/rss/1.0/modules/content/"
	xmlns:dc="http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/"
	xmlns:atom="http://www.w3.org/2005/Atom"
	xmlns:sy="http://purl.org/rss/1.0/modules/syndication/"
		>
<channel>
	<title>Comments on: What is &#8220;risk&#8221;?</title>
	<atom:link href="http://blog.capablepeople.co.uk/2009/11/what-is-risk/feed/" rel="self" type="application/rss+xml" />
	<link>http://blog.capablepeople.co.uk/2009/11/what-is-risk/</link>
	<description>Just another WordPress weblog</description>
	<lastBuildDate>Fri, 23 Jul 2010 13:21:10 +0000</lastBuildDate>
	<sy:updatePeriod>hourly</sy:updatePeriod>
	<sy:updateFrequency>1</sy:updateFrequency>
	<generator>http://wordpress.org/?v=3.0</generator>
	<item>
		<title>By: admin</title>
		<link>http://blog.capablepeople.co.uk/2009/11/what-is-risk/comment-page-1/#comment-6696</link>
		<dc:creator>admin</dc:creator>
		<pubDate>Wed, 21 Jul 2010 09:12:21 +0000</pubDate>
		<guid isPermaLink="false">http://blog.capablepeople.co.uk/?p=1204#comment-6696</guid>
		<description>Thanks for that thoughtful comment Mark and that great link. I am always amazed by people who cite an example of something done badly as an argument to invalidate the entire approach. No doubt if John Seddon came and took a look at my fence he would press for the abolition of all fences and similar boundary defining items

Cheers</description>
		<content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>Thanks for that thoughtful comment Mark and that great link. I am always amazed by people who cite an example of something done badly as an argument to invalidate the entire approach. No doubt if John Seddon came and took a look at my fence he would press for the abolition of all fences and similar boundary defining items</p>
<p>Cheers</p>
]]></content:encoded>
	</item>
	<item>
		<title>By: Mark Harbor</title>
		<link>http://blog.capablepeople.co.uk/2009/11/what-is-risk/comment-page-1/#comment-6675</link>
		<dc:creator>Mark Harbor</dc:creator>
		<pubDate>Tue, 20 Jul 2010 21:26:36 +0000</pubDate>
		<guid isPermaLink="false">http://blog.capablepeople.co.uk/?p=1204#comment-6675</guid>
		<description>Unfortunately Shaun, many people seem to use hazard (or consequence of hazard) and risk synonymously...even some of our safety specialists who should really know better.

The HSE (Nuclear Safety Directorate) have produced a document called The Tolerability of Risk From Nuclear Power Stations (link:  http://www.hse.gov.uk/nuclear/tolerability.pdf) that tries to shed a degree of common sense on the subject, but I&#039;ve noticed that level, or rather perception of level of risk often varies with a particular inspector&#039;s particular bug-bear. 

This is not something restricted to HSE inspectors of course...my MD in Consett wouldn&#039;t consider Brake Presses, even when these were the most effective and efficient tool for the job, because he&#039;d witnessed an accident in his past

Seddon and his cohorts &#039;dis&#039; risk assessment as a tool, and have recently cited the recent volcano dust problems as examples of why risk assessment is a less than useful tool

A guy, Dave Snowden, a leading light in Knowledge Management, has started to highlight something called Power Distributions (see this blog &gt; http://www.cognitive-edge.com/blogs/dave/2010/01/elephants_fleas_and_the_city_o.php) where the outlier events in the areas beyond the 6 Sigma point on Gaussian distribution start to become more likely (thus increasing the risk). His argument is that systems, particularly in what he calls the complex domain, need to be resilient (being able to handle the unlikely) rather than robust (that is designed to handle every eventuality).

The problem I guess is that &#039;tolerability&#039; of risk is a very subjective matter...I guess the guys involved in Chernobyl thought the risk was tolerable!</description>
		<content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>Unfortunately Shaun, many people seem to use hazard (or consequence of hazard) and risk synonymously&#8230;even some of our safety specialists who should really know better.</p>
<p>The HSE (Nuclear Safety Directorate) have produced a document called The Tolerability of Risk From Nuclear Power Stations (link:  <a href="http://www.hse.gov.uk/nuclear/tolerability.pdf)" rel="nofollow">http://www.hse.gov.uk/nuclear/tolerability.pdf)</a> that tries to shed a degree of common sense on the subject, but I&#8217;ve noticed that level, or rather perception of level of risk often varies with a particular inspector&#8217;s particular bug-bear. </p>
<p>This is not something restricted to HSE inspectors of course&#8230;my MD in Consett wouldn&#8217;t consider Brake Presses, even when these were the most effective and efficient tool for the job, because he&#8217;d witnessed an accident in his past</p>
<p>Seddon and his cohorts &#8216;dis&#8217; risk assessment as a tool, and have recently cited the recent volcano dust problems as examples of why risk assessment is a less than useful tool</p>
<p>A guy, Dave Snowden, a leading light in Knowledge Management, has started to highlight something called Power Distributions (see this blog &gt; <a href="http://www.cognitive-edge.com/blogs/dave/2010/01/elephants_fleas_and_the_city_o.php)" rel="nofollow">http://www.cognitive-edge.com/blogs/dave/2010/01/elephants_fleas_and_the_city_o.php)</a> where the outlier events in the areas beyond the 6 Sigma point on Gaussian distribution start to become more likely (thus increasing the risk). His argument is that systems, particularly in what he calls the complex domain, need to be resilient (being able to handle the unlikely) rather than robust (that is designed to handle every eventuality).</p>
<p>The problem I guess is that &#8216;tolerability&#8217; of risk is a very subjective matter&#8230;I guess the guys involved in Chernobyl thought the risk was tolerable!</p>
]]></content:encoded>
	</item>
</channel>
</rss>
